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Abstract 
 
Background 
Evolution of cooperative behaviour is widely studied in different models where 
interaction is heterogeneous, although static among individuals. However, in nature 
individuals can often recognize each other and chose, besides to cooperate or not, to 
preferentially associate with or to avoid certain individuals. 
Here we consider a dynamical interaction graph, in contrast to a static one. We propose 
several rules of rejecting unwanted partners and seeking out new ones, and study the 
probability of emergence and maintenance of cooperation on these dynamic networks.  
Results 
Our simulations reveal that cooperation can evolve and be stable in the population if we 
introduce preferential linking, even if defectors can perform it too. The fixation of 
cooperation has higher probability than that of on static graphs, and this effect is more 
prevalent at high benefit to cost ratios. We also find an optimal number of partners, for 
which the fixation probability of cooperation shows a maximum. 
Conclusions 
The ability to recognize, seek out or avoid interaction partners based on the outcome of 
past interactions has an important effect on the emergence of cooperation. Observations 
about the number of partners in natural cooperating groups are in concordance with the 
result of our model. 
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Background  
Evolution of cooperation and altruism remains one of the most intensively studied 
problems of evolutionary biology [1, 2]. On the one hand, the interest is based on the fact 
that cooperation between competing entities to form a larger, more complex unit played a 
central role in all the major transitions in evolution [3]. On the other hand, the evolution 
of altruistic or cooperative acts seems to be a notoriously hard problem, which has 
provided a challenge for decades. To explain the evolution of cooperation one has to 
answer the following questions: 1. How can a cooperative (altruistic) act spread in a 
population where originally only defectors existed? 2. How is the spread of cheaters 
(agents that enjoy the benefit of cooperation, but don't invest into it) hindered in a 
population of cooperative individuals? 
There are several factors listed which play a central role in the evolution and 
stability of cooperation [2]. While kin selection is an important mechanism responsible 
for the evolution of altruistic and cooperative behaviour [4], there are cases when kinship 
among cooperators or reciprocal altruist is probably too low to explain these behaviours 
(e.g. [5-15], etc.). The general theoretical framework for studying cooperation of 
unrelated individuals is the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game [16], in which partners can 
choose either a selfish (defective) or a cooperative strategy. If both partners defect, they 
get a smaller fitness (P) than if both cooperate (R), but a defector gets an even higher 
fitness value when its opponent cooperates (T). However, the cooperator receives the 
smallest fitness of all if its opponent is a defector (S). Consequently, although mutual 
cooperation would result in a higher fitness, defection is the only evolutionarily stable 
state in this model. Defectors can invade and destroy cooperation in a cooperative 
population while cooperators cannot spread in a defective population [16, 17]. Thus in 
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this situation it remains challenging to explain the emergence and stability of 
cooperation. 
Nowak and May [18] examined a spatial version of the PD game by placing 
individuals on the nodes of a rectangular grid. Individuals, which can be either defectors 
or cooperators, can interact only with their nearest neighbours. Payoffs and thus their 
relative fitnesses are computed according to the PD game. The same individuals are in 
competition for empty places, and the success of competition is proportional to the 
relative fitness of an individual. They found that cooperative and defective strategies 
persist in stable coexistence if the benefit (b) of the altruistic act divided by its cost (c) 
ratio is high enough. This polymorph equilibrium of cooperators and defectors is the 
consequence of limited interaction range among the individuals and limited dispersal as 
well [19] (but see [20] for an alternative explanation using kin selection). 
Grid (regular graph) models are adequate only for sessile organisms or if spatial 
arrangement of animals also strongly correlates with their associations and/or rank (e.g. 
[21, 22]). However interaction topologies are far from regular graphs in most cases (i.e. 
individuals don’t necessary have the same number of partners, nor are they arranged in 
the special topology of a regular graph). 
For example small world social network structures were found for bottlenose 
dolphins (Tursiops sp.) [23], three-spined stickleback (Gasterosteus aculeatus) [24, 25] 
and guppies (Poecilia reticulata) [26]. Human social network is also far from a regular 
graph, as was found for example for an instant messaging network [27], an e-mail 
network [28] or a scientific collaboration network [29, 30]. 
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The study of the evolution and maintenance of cooperative behaviour has recently 
shifted to employ non-regular graphs. While cooperative strategy survives only if 
benefit/cost ratio is high for regular graphs [18, 31], it dominates for degree 
heterogeneous graphs (i.e. when individuals can have different number of partners) even 
if benefit/cost ratio is close to one [32-36]. It is important to note however, that the 
positive effect of degree heterogeneous graphs on the evolution of cooperation is valid 
only if the total payoff of an individual is computed as the sum of payoffs received by its 
neighbours. If payoffs are normalised by the edges then degree heterogeneous graphs 
behave similar to degree homogeneous graphs (e.g. regular graphs) [37-39]. Similarly, 
the results are sensitive to the update rule, that is to the rule how local competition, birth 
and death events are achieved [31]. Finally, cooperators and defectors are present with 
the same frequency initially in the above mentioned studies, thus these works are focused 
rather on the stability of cooperative strategies assuming that somehow it become 
abundant previously, but don't deal with the invasion of cooperators in a population of 
defectors. 
Other recent works focused on the fixation probability of a single cooperator 
among defectors in different networks [40, 41]. Ohtsuki et al. [31] have shown that if 
they use the so called “death-birth” update rule (details see below) then  selection favours 
cooperation (i.e. the average fixation probability of a single cooperator is higher than the 
fixation probability of a neutral mutant) in the PD game if the b/c ratio exceeds the 
average number of neighbours in the network ( k ), that is, if b/c > k . They found this 
relation to be approximately valid in populations of different structure, in which 
interaction topology is described variously by regular, random regular, random, or scale-
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free graphs.  Taylor et al. [41] have proved mathematically that this relation is 
approximately valid for bi-transitive graphs.  
As we emphasized above, the evolutionary stability of cooperation is increased in 
graph heterogeneous networks [33], while the average probability of invasion of it 
depends mainly on the average number of neighbours [31, 41]. Although this difference 
seems to be a contradiction, there is a rather simple intuitive explanation of it. If half of 
the nodes are occupied by cooperators initially then on average half of the hubs are 
occupied by cooperators as well. These hubs are the core of the spread of cooperators, 
since if a hub and a sufficient number of its neighbours are occupied by cooperators then 
its defecting neighbours could not invade this node. If the invasion probability of 
cooperators is studied then a single cooperator is placed to a randomly selected node 
which can have different number of edges according to the edge distribution of the 
network. Fixation probability of a single cooperator increases linearly with edge number 
of the node (Kun and Scheuring unpublished and [35]), thus the average fixation 
probability is proportional to the average number of neighbours. 
Another feature of the original spatial games is the static nature of the interaction 
topology. However interaction network are seldom static. Many animals live in fission-
fusion societies (African elephants, Loxodonta africana [42, 43]; bottlenose dolphins, 
Tursiops sp., [44, 45]; spotted hyena, Crocuta crocuta, [46]; chimpanzee, Pan sp., [47]; 
northern bottlenose whales, Hyperoodon ampullatus, [48]; spider monkeys, Ateles 
geoffroyi [49]), where small groups / individuals join and separate iteratively. Besides the 
above mentioned evidences, associations are non-random in a number of other systems as 
well (e.g. [25, 50-52]). While a simple foraging model can produce non-random 
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association between individuals [53], it is clear that certain animals can very well choose 
with whom they want to associate. One intriguing example is found in bottlenose 
dolphins, where individuals can associate with different other individuals for different 
tasks (foraging, rest, social activity, travel) [54]. This implies that they can form 
associations based on with whom can they perform a certain act better. 
As animals can recognize each other [55, 56], there is a possibility to interact only 
with selected individuals. With respect to cooperation this can have the effect of 
cooperators preferentially attach to other cooperators, and shy away from defectors. For 
example, dominant female hyenas offered more food and coalition support to closely 
associated subordinates, whom in return can help in food capture and defense [7]. 
Moreover they can discern relative rank [57], thus have the mental capacity to make 
choices assumed in the presented model. 
In the light of field observations, it is becoming increasingly important to study the 
evolution of cooperation on dynamical networks. Some recent studies focused on the 
fixation probability of a single cooperator among defectors in the case when graph 
dynamics is much faster than dynamics of evolution [58, 59]. In these works individuals 
differ in the rate at which they seek a new link. The linking dynamics slightly transforms 
the payoff matrix, in a way which favours the fixation probability of the cooperative 
strategy if the life-span of links among cooperators is high enough compared to the life-
span of links among cooperators and defectors. In other studies where the relative speed 
of graph and evolutionary dynamics are varied systematically it is assumed that 
cooperators and defectors initially are in the same fraction in the population [60, 61]. It is 
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found that random relinking is detrimental to the cooperative strategy [62], while 
preferential link dynamics helps cooperators to prevail in the population [63-67]. 
Experimental evidences in this field are few and unclear. Croft et al. [26] found that 
guppies reduce cooperative aid to partners that defected in the recent past, however no 
such behaviour was detected in another experiment [68]. 
We know that mere random network dynamic decreases the fixation probability of 
a single cooperator among defectors, simply because random re-linking dilutes the 
cooperators’ associations [69]. This case will serve as a control for our investigation. 
The aim of this study is twofold. First, we advance our understanding of the 
evolution of cooperation on dynamical graphs. Here we study how preferential 
association can affect the fixation probability of a single cooperator among defectors. We 
compare three different strategies of partner choice / partner rejection: “Random choice” 
refers to the case when the focal individual chooses to reject a defecting associate, and 
chooses a new associate randomly. The strategy “Get rid of defectors” allows the new 
partner to choose which of its associate to reject. The last strategy “The friend of my 
friend is my friend” is based on triadic closure, which is an important mechanism in the 
dynamic of social networks [70]. In this case individuals try to associate with associates 
of trustworthy partners. To study the role of partner choice strategies independently to 
network topology our defined strategies keep the networks structures intact. 
Second, we would like to review and synthesize the experimental data available on 
animal societies with the recent works on games on dynamical graphs. The mainstream 
literature on evolutionary game theory, while building more and more sophisticated 
models, has mostly ignored the vast literature on animal behaviour. This is unfortunate as 
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there is a wealth of information available which can make theoretical models more 
realistic and/or the results more relevant to biology. By comparing and discussing our 
models in the light of observations and experiments we can in turn hope that empirical 
researchers will test our and others hypotheses and/or provide us with valuable data for 
models.  
Results  
Observations show that preferential attachment generally benefits cooperators (Fig 
2). The fixation probability of the cooperative strategy increases with higher probability 
of preferential linking (higher ). As Fig 2 demonstrates cooperative strategy fixates 
with lower probability when linking is non-selective. Preferential linking can 
counterbalance it, and the fixation probability can be much higher than observed for a 
static network. In case of small b preferential attachment can increase fixation probability 
above the referential fixation probability of a neutral mutant in a well mixed population, 
thus cooperation can spread, where without such preferential attachment it could not (see 
Fig 2). 
Preferential attachment increases the fixation probability of cooperation more if the 
relative benefit of cooperation (b/c) is higher or when the mean connectivity (<k>) is 
higher. Even at lower benefit of cooperation assortative linking can increase the fixation 
probability to a higher level than expected for a neutral mutant. With high benefit, 
cooperation would fixate more probable than a neutral mutant even without preferential 
attachment, but preferential attachment reinforces the evolution of cooperation (compare 
open vs. solid symbols on Fig 2). 
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Introduction of more complex relinking rules (“Get rid of defectors” and “The 
friend of my friend is my friend”) (Fig 1b-1c) enhances cooperation further. We know 
from the literature [31], that if the benefit (b) can be expressed as b n k , where n is an 
integer number, then the fixation probability is lower for higher k  at static graphs (at 
least in the k =2-10 range). However, fixation probability increases more with higher 
k , and surpasses the case with lower k  for dynamical graphs (filled symbols in Fig 
2). 
Fig 3 shows that there is a k  where the fixation probability is maximal. We have 
found that this optimal average connectivity is about 14-18. 
In the next series of numerical experiments we have interpolated the points where 
the fixation probability is 1 N , the probability of fixation of a neutral mutant in a well-
mixed population. Simulations were carried out with 2 kept constant, and b varied with 
0.5 increments (sometimes finer increment is used). The interpolation was done from at 
least 3 points both above and below the 0.01 probability line (for 100N  ). The points 
obtained for the different relinking regimes divide up the parameter space where 
cooperation can fixate (to the right and up from the point) and where it could not (bottom 
left corner) (Fig 4).  
It can bee seen from Fig 4 that even the simplest random search for other 
cooperating partners results in a widening parameter space, where cooperation can fixate 
more effectively than a neutral mutant could. Thus higher probability of preferential 
linking can lead to cooperation in cases, where otherwise cooperation cannot be attained. 
Also cooperation can evolve at lower probability of preferential linking for the “Get rid 
 11
of defectors” and “The friend of my friend is my friend” rules than for the random choice 
relinking rule. That is, spread of cooperation is possible at even lower values of b, if more 
complex relinking rules are used. 
When we allow defectors to avoid other defectors (PAVLOV scenario) we observe 
decreasing fixation probability of cooperators as the probability of preferential linking 
increases (Fig 5). Thus when search for new partner is random, assortative partner choice 
only promotes cooperation when defectors are not allowed to do the same (compare Fig 
5a with Fig 2a). More sophisticated relinking rules however give back qualitatively the 
same results as above (compare Fig 2b-c with Fig 5b-c), thus even if defectors could 
avoid their own ilk or try to interact with their cooperative partner’s other partners, 
cooperative behaviour has an increasing probability of fixation with increasing 
assortativeness. These results also serve as a robustness check for our model, as this 
assumption does not affect our main results. 
Discussion 
We have shown that preferential attachment promotes the evolution of cooperation 
in graphs where re-linking rules were defined to keep the degree distribution constant. A 
behaviour that allows cooperators to recognize cheaters, and then avoid interaction with 
such individuals can facilitate the evolution of cooperation in otherwise unfavourable 
circumstances (Fig 2). This scenario seems to assume that cooperators have higher 
mental capabilities as only cooperators can recognise exploitation and avoid it (note that 
cooperators cannot distinguish defectors before interacting with them), but defectors 
cannot do the same. We have investigated a model setup where both cooperators and 
defectors were allowed to reconsider their interactions. Except for random choice (Fig 5), 
the possibility of partner choice increases the fixation probability of cooperators even in 
this case. 
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Fixation probability shows a maximum as a function of average connectivity. The 
intuitive explanation of this result is the following: at low connectivity, a cooperator 
cluster can easily break up when a defector replaces a cooperator, and dilutes the 
beneficial effect of cooperator aggregation. However at high connectivity, the invasion of 
one defector into a cooperator cluster causes only a minor loss to the surrounding 
cooperators, as they have many other cooperator neighbours. Further, with preferential 
relinking, the invasion of the defector is generally only temporary as cooperators are 
working on avoiding it, especially with rule 3 of preferential linking (“The friend of my 
friend is my friend”). One has a higher chance to find a new cooperator neighbour when 
one has multiple cooperator neighbours. In contrast, as k  increases, the fixation 
probability of cooperation decreases [31], because the chance for the emergence of 
cooperator clusters decreases. So while it is easier to purify cooperator aggregations 
when the connectivity is higher, the detrimental effect of high k  soon overtakes this 
advantage. The result of these two effects determines the shape of the fixation probability 
function.  
We note here that the defined re-linking rules are so called partner swapping rules 
which is not very effective against defectors. The consequence of the rule is that a 
selectively aborted defector definitely has a chance to parasite a new cooperative partner. 
So our re-linking rule is not very effective to oust defectors from the society. However 
cooperation associations can form, which associations can be exploited by defectors only 
temporarily, thus the detrimental effect of defectors on cooperators is only marginal 
compared to that of solitary cooperators. 
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While the fact that there is a maximum in the fixation probability as a function of 
the mean connectivity is intuitive, the value where the maximum appears is not trivial. 
We found that the fixation probability is maximal at around 14 18k   . Thus an 
individual interacts on a long term with around 14-18 other individuals. Interestingly we 
find rather similar association sizes in cooperative species (Table 1). We do not claim 
that group size and connectivity are solely affected by the benefit of cooperation. Indeed, 
group sizes are affected by a great variety of ecological factors. For example, groups of 
birds benefit from increased vigilance if groups size is larger, as each individual has to be 
on sentry for less amount of time, but interference competition puts a limit on the size of 
the group [71]. Another interesting example is that wolves not necessarily infer foraging 
benefit from group living [72], but larger group can defend the captured prey from 
scavenging ravens more efficiently [73]. Recently, Voelkl and Kasper [74] have shown 
that the social network of some 70 primate groups facilitates the spread of cooperation.  
Thus we find the similarities between the levels of connectivity of real social networks of 
animals and the optimal connectivity found in our model suggestive.  
We note that long term association or connectivity should not be confused with 
group (clan, herd, etc.) size. The two can be very different as group sizes can be much 
larger than presented in Table 1 for connectivity values. For example, observed group 
size of chimpanzees have a mean of 55, and a maximum of 120 [47]. However, foraging 
and patrol parties are of size 5-7 [75]. This translates to average connectivity of 4-6 
during patrol. 
We have assumed that individuals associate for a long time, and while a few 
changes in partnership within one’s life are possible, the network dynamics is comparable 
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to the life cycle of the modeled organisms. Association times are commonly bimodal, as 
most of the associations last for a short time, and there is some very long-term association 
(e.g. [50, 76, 77]). Association between bottlenose dolphins can last for 20 years [44], 
albeit 7-8 years is more common [23] (they live for about 10-25 years, with maximum of 
40-50; [78]). Bottlenose whales usually associate for only a field season, but there is 
some long term (1-2 years) association between males. Roughly half of the associations 
of Spix’s disc-winged bats last for 150-420 days, and some up to 4 years [76]. One 
extreme is observed in small, isolated communities, where stable associations only 
change with birth and death, as observed for a population of Spinner dolphins (Stenella 
longirostis) [79]. One can safely argue, that these long term associations have a larger 
impact on individual’s fitness than the shorter ones, thus our model can capture the 
relevant time scales for network dynamics observed for certain group living species in 
nature. 
There are some studies where the topology of the interaction (as opposed to links, 
as here) was allowed to change [80, 81]. 
One possible extension of our model can investigate the effect of multi-tiered social 
organizations. Social grouping have many levels in a number of species, for example in 
zebras, where males with harems group for mutual defense [82]; and similar social 
composition was found in Yunnan snub-nosed monkeys (Rhinopithecus bieti) [83]. 
Furthermore dolphins [44, 45] and African elephants [43] also have multi-tiered social 
organization. 
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Conclusions  
We have shown that preferential attachment can increase the probability of the 
fixation of cooperative strategies, and this probability, contrary to what is observed for 
static interaction networks, is the highest at intermediate level of connectedness. This 
result is robust independently of how the details of preferential linking are defined and 
valid in a wide parameter space. The assumptions of our model fits the observations 
made for real word populations and would explain the higher connectedness of 
cooperating individuals observed in nature (Table 1). Interestingly the observed group 
sizes in real word populations appear to be close to the optimal connectedness in our 
model, where cooperation is easiest to maintain/achieve. 
Methods 
Here we consider a population where the interactions are described by a scale-free 
graph that can vary in time. Scale-free networks are generated according to the method of 
preferential attachment [84, 85]). The population of N  individuals consists of defectors 
and cooperators. An individual derives its payoff, P from interactions with adjacent 
individuals. A cooperator provides help to all individuals to whom it is connected, thus it 
pays a cost (c) for each of its interaction. Neigbours of a cooperator receive the benefit 
(b). Generally, if a cooperator is connected to k other individuals and i of those are 
cooperators, then its payoff is bi ck . A defector does not provide any help, and 
therefore its interaction has no costs. However it still receives the benefit from 
neighbouring cooperators, thus if a defector is connected to j cooperators, then its payoff 
is bj. The fitness of a player i is 1 w  wPi, where w measures the intensity of the 
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selection and Pi is the payoff of the player. Here we assume weak selection where the 
payoff is small compared to the baseline fitness ( 1w  ). 
We employed a “death-birth” updating scheme based on previous studies (e.g. [31, 
86]), where at each update a randomly chosen individual dies; and subsequently its 
neighbours compete for the empty site in proportion to their fitnesses. Accordingly, the 
probability that neighbour i occupies the emptied site is 
1
ik
i j
j
P P , where the fitness of all 
neighbours are summed. We note here that the success of the cooperative strategy 
critically depends on the applied update rule and death-birth scheme is the most 
beneficial update rule for the evolution of cooperation [19, 31, 86]. 
The interaction network was allowed to change in the following way. At each 
update we chose a node randomly. We tested each link of this node, whether they would 
change or not according to given probabilities, which probability is independent of the 
past action, and only depends on the composition of the current interaction 
neighbourhood. If the focal player is a cooperator and a link connects it to a defector, 
then the probability of changing that link is  and  otherwise. Probability  refers to 
the basic speed of re-linking in the population, assuming that  means that 
cooperators selectively shun links with defectors to avoid exploitation, thus 2 measures 
the probability of preferential linking. Consequently we study the spread of a mutant 
strategy which cooperates and tends to avoid defectors at the same time (). Thus 
here we assumed that only cooperators are allowed to avoid defectors with a higher 
probability. Alternatively we also considered the case when not only cooperators are 
allowed to avoid defectors with increased probability. Individuals have no memory, thus 
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a preferentially aborted connection could by chance re-linked later. In those simulations 
any individuals connecting to a defector had a higher probability of relinking. This 
strategy is similar to the PAVLOV strategy [87] of “win stay, loose shift”. 
In order to keep the global degree distribution unchanged, we used a specific rule 
for relinking. The edge between the focal site and a selected neighbour was exchanged 
with the edge connecting the chosen site to one of its neighbours. For example, if A to B, 
and C to D, were connected originally, then after the update, A is connected to C, and B 
is connected to D. The exchange is allowed only if the new graph remains connected (i.e. 
there is a path from every node to every other node), and none of the new connections 
would connect individuals that are already connected. Because the number of edges 
belonging to a site never changes, the edge distribution of the graphs remain unchanged 
[88-90]. 
We investigated three scenarios, which differed in the selection of the edges to be 
changed, that is different preferential relinking rules. 
(a) Random choice. An edge between the focal site and a randomly chosen site is 
established. The randomly chosen site loses one of its randomly selected neighbours. This 
scenario implies that the focal individual searches randomly for a new interaction partner, 
and the chosen new partner abandons one of its connections at random (Fig 1a). 
(b) Get rid of defectors. An edge between the focal site and a randomly chosen 
individual is established. Both the focal individual and the randomly chosen individual 
loose one of their defector neighbours. If an individual does not have a defecting 
neighbour then a randomly chosen cooperating neighbour is lost (Fig 1b). 
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(c) A friend of my friend is my friend. The focal individual tries to establish a link 
with one of its cooperating neighbour’s neighbour. First a cooperating neighbour is 
selected randomly (or a random individual if none of them cooperates), then one of its 
neighbours is selected randomly. The focal individual will establish a connection with 
this individual. The selected new interaction partner looses one of its defecting 
neighbours, if it has at least one such a neighbour, otherwise connection with a randomly 
selected neighbour is deleted (Fig 1c). (We note here that the linking update mechanisms 
used by Santos et al. [61] is somehow similar to our update rule (b) and (c).) 
In numerical simulations, we measured the fixation probability of a single 
cooperator at different levels of graph dynamics (), different average numbers of 
neighbours ( k ), and variations in the benefit to cost ratio (b/c). The initial cooperator 
was placed in a randomly chosen node, and individuals updated until the whole 
population consisted of either cooperators or defectors. For each parameter combination 
we have made 1000 graphs, and on each graph the simulation was repeated 1000 times. 
The total number of repetitions was thus one million from which we computed the 
average fixation probability of a single cooperator ( C ). Since the fixation probability of 
a single neutral mutant would be 1 N , fixation of cooperators is supported by evolution 
if 1C N   [40]). For most of the simulations 100N   was used, except for Fig 3, 
where 500N  . Different population sizes give the same qualitative results. 
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Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1. Three rules for assortative partner choice. 
Schematic representation of the different assortative linking. (a) Random choice; (b) Get 
rid of defectors; (c) The friend of my friend is my friend. Black filled circle represents the 
focal individual. Gray filled circles represent defectors; circles with a crossed line 
represent cooperators; and open circle represent an individual with arbitrary strategy. 
Figure 2. Fixation probability of cooperators as a function of the assortativeness 
of partner choice. 
In each case cooperation is promoted for some proportion of the 2 parameter range 
compared to random. Squares <k>=4; circles <k>=8. Filled symbols b=<k>, open 
symbols b=2<k>. c=1, 1=0.05 and w=0.01 in all cases. The stand alone points represent 
the case when there is no network dynamics, i.e. 1=2=0.0. Dotted horizontal line 
represents the line above which cooperators fixate with higher than random probability. 
Figure 3. Fixation probability of cooperation shows an optimum at medium 
connectedness/association sizes with preferential attachment rules. 
Fixation probability of cooperation with different rules for preferential attachment at 
different average connectivity. Squares represent random relinking; circles “Get rid of 
defectors”; and triangles “The friend of my friend is my friend”. Filled symbols represent 
b= k  and open symbols b=2 k . c=1, 1=0.05, 2=0.95, w=0.01 and 500N   in all 
cases.  
Figure 4. Areas of the parameter space where cooperation can fixate with higher 
than random probability. 
The areas of cooperator and defector dominance with different relinking rules. 
Sophisticated relinking rules extend the region where cooperation becomes dominant. 
The parameter space is shown for the benefit of cooperation (b) vs. the assortatitvity (2) 
a. <k>=4, b. <k>=8. c=1, 1=0.05 and w=0.01 in all cases.  Squares random relinking; 
circles “Get rid of defectors”; triangles “The friend of my friend is my friend”. A bold 
letter D shows the area where defectors dominate and a bold letter C where cooperators 
dominate. 
Figure 5. “Win-stay – loose-relink wisely”. 
Fixation probability of cooperators as a function of probability of preferential linking in 
the PAVLOV scenario. In the PAVLOV scenario, defectors are allowed to seek new 
partners like cooperators, but preferential relinking still promotes cooperation. In the case 
of random relinking rule however cooperation is unfavoured. 
Squares <k>=4; circles <k>=8. Filled symbols b=<k>, open symbols b=2<k>. c=1, 1=0.05 and w=0.01 in all cases. The stand alone points represent the case when there is 
no network dynamics, i.e. 1=2=0.0. Dotted horizontal line represents the line above 
which cooperators fixate with higher than random probability. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Connectivities in animal societies 
Species Connectivity1 Ref. 
Ring-tailed coatis (Nasua nasue) 15.3±6.1 [91] 
Ring-tailed coatis (Nasua nasue) 17.0±3.2 and 10.2±1.3 [92] 
Three-spined stickleback (Gasterosteus aculeatus) 14±11 [24] 
Three-spined stickleback (Gasterosteus aculeatus) 28.2 [25] 
Bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops sp.) 4.97 [93] 
Bottlenose whales (Hyperoodon ampullatus) 4.17 [48] 
Long-finned pilot whales (Globicephala melas) 11-12 [50] 
Killer whales (Orcinus orca) 2.05 [94] 
Spix’s disc-winged bat (Thyroptera tricolor) 2.9-3.4 [76] 
Guppy (Poecilia reticulata) 14.7 [26] 
Guppy (Poecilia reticulata) 14.7; 17.3; 21.9; 22.7 [25] 
Grevy’s zebra (Equus grevyi) 7.08 [82] 
Onager (Equus hemionus) 10.75 [82] 
1
 Connectivity was either recorded from an interaction network, or inferred from 
measurement of association patterns. 
 
